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Entirely unnecessarily, the court further considered whether there
was any general public policy principle not to enforce the Iranian law.
It decided that there was not, indeed there are positive reasons of
comity to enforce the cultural heritage provisions of foreign states, at
[154]. But the idea that choice of law is grounded in comity is
challengeable. In addition, this dangerous aside entirely misinterprets
the role of public policy in conflict of laws. Where the applicable law
determines the result, public policy has a negative (not positive) effect
and only in the rarest of cases. Otherwise, the courts will be tempted
into investigating the content of the foreign law, and refusing to apply
law it dislikes. That would undermine the foundations of choice of
law.
These cultural heritage cases remain uncertain. They will turn on
the drafting of the original law and its unpredictable interpretation by
English courts. Also, facts which are merely coincidental become
critical; such as whether in law or fact the state was in possession of the
artefact, who now is in possession and who is making or defending the
claim. The many international instruments seem to lack real effect as
none was relevant to this appeal. Property cases need clear rules, those
who have acquired the artefacts should be able to predict the outcome
and international art thieves must be discouraged. The judgment has
done little to clear the muddy waters.
PIPPA ROGERSON
MODIFICATION AND DISCHARGE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: THE HOUSING
ACT 1985
IN Lawntown Ltd. v. Camenzuli [2007] EWCA Civ 949, [2008] 1 All
E.R. 446, the Court of Appeal provided the first guidance on the
exercise of the county court’s discretion under section 610 of the
Housing Act 1985 to modify or discharge restrictive covenants. This
discretion is distinct from the analogous and more familiar power of
the Lands Tribunal under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925,
as amended.
The Camenzulis owned one of a pair of semi-detached houses in
London on an estate of similar properties; all were originally intended
to be single dwellings. Both their home and the adjoining property,
bought by Lawntown Ltd., a property development company, were
subject to restrictive covenants prohibiting conversion of the houses
into flats. Lawntown began work converting their property into flats
only to face objections from the Camenzulis on two grounds: no
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planning permission had been granted for the alterations; and, the
property was burdened by covenants prohibiting the conversion.
So far, so normal. In an era of growing pressure on housing stocks,
such disputes between developers and neighbours are frequent,
particularly given the prevalence of restrictive covenants prohibiting
development. The Land Registry estimates that 79 per cent. of existing
registered freehold titles, or some 13 million, are subject to restrictive
covenants of some description. Such covenants are not merely relics of
an historical heyday following the decision in Tulk v.Moxhay (1848) 2
Ph. 774, since approximately 270,000–300,000 new restrictive cove-
nants were registered against freehold titles each year in the period
2003–2005 (Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 186, Easements,
Covenants and Profits a` Prendre (2008)).
Restrictive covenants appeal to a particularly human desire to
control and prevent ‘‘unacceptable’’ uses of land. They are prized for
their ability to impose particularly individualistic and localised fetters
over the use of land, e.g. preventing development, restricting use and
controlling the appearance, size of buildings and the density of
occupation. There is a tension between these private land use controls
and the statutory public controls of planning and environmental law.
Each regime has a ‘‘distinctive and fundamentally different raison
d’eˆtre’’ with covenants ‘‘geared to the protection of private property
rights’’ whilst planning law looks to the ‘‘public interest and good’’
(D.L. Sabey and A.R. Everton, The Restrictive Covenant in the Control
of Land Use (Aldershot 1999), pp. 3–4).
The relationship between the two systems is often fraught. In
Lawntown itself the conversion was delayed by covenants, not the
planning permission process. The developer could have applied to the
Lands Tribunal to modify or discharge the covenant on one of the four
familiar statutory grounds contained in section 84, namely: that the
property’s or neighbourhood’s changed character or other circum-
stances render the covenant obsolete; that reasonable use is impeded
and the covenant provides no practical benefit, or is contrary to the
public interest and, in either case, money would be adequate
compensation for any loss; that the parties involved have expressly
or impliedly agreed to the modification or discharge of the covenant;
or finally, that those benefiting from the covenant would not be
injured by the order sought.
However, Lawntown chose to take a different route by applying to
the county court under section 610. This neglected statutory provision
is a boon for those seeking to avoid the consequences of restrictive
covenants limiting development. Whilst the scope of section 610 is
narrower than that of section 84, applying as it does only to covenants
requiring properties to remain as single dwellings, it is much easier to
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satisfy. Section 610 allows a local housing authority or a ‘‘person
interested in a house’’ to apply to the court for relief where, under
subsections (1)(a) and (b) respectively, either: due to changes in the
‘‘character of the neighbourhood’’ the house in question ‘‘cannot
readily’’ be let as a single dwelling, but could be let if it comprised two
or more dwellings; or, where planning permission has been granted for
the conversion of a house from a single dwelling to two or more
dwellings but this is ‘‘prohibited or restricted by the provisions of the
lease of the house, or by a restrictive covenant affecting the house, or
otherwise’’. Agreeing with the judge at first instance, the Court of
Appeal held that section 610 and section 84 were ‘‘plainly intended’’ to
be separate regimes, but that matters pertinent to a section 84
application might be relevant under section 610 as well.
In deciding to discharge the covenant, the Court of Appeal stressed
the importance of carrying out a ‘‘balancing exercise’’ when
considering the interests protected by the restrictive covenant, and
the public or private advantages resulting from the variation. On the
facts of Lawntown, Richards L.J. held that the Camenzulis’ concerns
about the appearance of the property, density of occupation, and
alleged diminution of property values were not of great weight.
Preserving the character of the neighbourhood, and the fear that an
adverse precedent might be set, were however valid and more
compelling concerns. Conversely, the developer wished to alter its
property, and had subsequently been granted planning permission
after careful scrutiny by the local planning authority despite the
Camenzulis’ objections. As with section 84, however, there was no
statutory presumption under the Housing Act 1985 that restrictive
covenants should be varied when planning permission had been
granted (see Re Martin’s Application (1988) 57 P. & C.R. 119).
The most significant and weighty factor which tipped the balance
‘‘decisively’’ in favour of Lawntown was the ‘‘urgent demand for more
housing in London’’. Planning policies setting ambitious housing
targets reflect matters of wider public interest; it was ‘‘legitimate and
appropriate’’ for the court to have regard to the ‘‘public benefit’’ of
meeting the need for additional homes ‘‘through conversion of existing
houses into flats’’. The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge at first
instance that its discretion to vary the terms of a covenant ‘‘subject to
such conditions and terms as the court may think just’’ allowed for
compensation to be provided. However, on the facts this was
inappropriate, since there was no evidence that loss had been suffered.
Lawntown suggests that in this ‘‘small and crowded island’’
facilitating the conversion and redevelopment of property for the
wider public benefit will trump private controls on land use. Section
610, rather than section 84, is likely to become an ever more valuable
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tool for developers seeking to avoid such restrictive covenants; it seems
that for once, the grass really is greener on the other side.
EMMA WARING
DISCLOSURE OF A SETTLOR’S WISH LETTER IN A DISCRETIONARY TRUST
IN Breakspear v. Ackland [2008] EWHC 220 (Ch) Briggs J. ordered
that a ‘‘wish letter’’, written by the settlor to the trustees of a
discretionary settlement, should be disclosed to the trust beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries had applied to the court to challenge the trustees’
refusal to disclose the letter, and to invoke the court’s inherent
supervisory jurisdiction to order disclosure of it. There was at that
stage no question of any contentious proceedings between the parties
so the beneficiaries could not seek disclosure and inspection of the
letter, along with any other relevant documents in the trustees’ control,
under Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The trustees intended,
however, to wind up the trust a few years later and to apply to the
court at that stage to sanction a scheme for distributing the trust assets
to the beneficiaries. The contents of the settlor’s wish letter would
become directly relevant to that application.
Briggs J. held that the need to avoid re-considering whether the
letter should be disclosed at that later stage justified an order for
disclosure of it in the proceedings before him. But without that
exceptional fact he would have treated the settlor’s letter as
confidential to the trustees. It was not enough to justify letting the
beneficiaries see the letter that they wanted to plan their lives and were
interested to know how the settlor might have wanted the trustees to
exercise their dispositive powers in the future.
Wish letters are a common feature of modern discretionary
settlements. A settlor often confers broad dispositive discretions upon
the trustees. There may be nothing on the face of the trust instrument
to indicate what purposes the settlor had in mind in creating the trust;
which of the beneficiaries he actually wanted to benefit from the
exercise of the trustees’ dispositive powers; and in what order of
priority they should benefit. The wish letter is a non-binding guidance
from the settlor to the trustee. It indicates what things the trustees
should take into account in exercising their discretions. In reality, it is
likely to inform the reasons for the exercise of the trustees’
appointments of capital and income to the beneficiaries. Most
beneficiaries would be curious, at the very least, to know what it says.
The significance of Breakspear is that it holds that the trustees and
the court are generally justified in keeping the wish letter confidential
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